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Abstract 
 
 The paper provides theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of 
foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy 
mechanisms. We propose an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro (1990) 
by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system on the 
private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on data from 53 African 
countries for the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are 
overwhelmingly consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, 
those of the ‘government expenditure’ channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with 
the theoretical postulations. Justification for the slight heterogeneity and policy implications are 
discussed.    
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1.  Introduction  
 The issue of whether development assistance improves growth in recipient countries can 
be traced back to the two-gap model (Chenery & Strout, 1966), which to the best of our 
knowledge remains the most influential theoretical underpinning in the literature on aid 
effectiveness. According to the narrative, developing countries face serious constraints in savings 
and ‘export earnings’ that are not conducive for the growth of investment. In spite of severe 
criticisms since its inception, this model has provided a background for early aid policies 
(Easterly, 1999) and empirical specifications in many studies (Masud & Yontcheva, 1999). 
Accordingly, both the Harrod-Domar and Solow growth models which constitute the principal 
theoretical underpinnings in the foreign aid literature are based on the need for substantial aid-
driven investment, with the purpose of reducing the poverty gap between developed and poor 
countries.   
The effect of development assistance on private sector investment has long been an 
important issue of debate. Many economists have adopted the position that aid stimulates private 
investment in least developed countries (LDCs) by improving macroeconomic savings, while 
others have contended that aid has a negative effect on private investment because, inter alia, it: 
(i) is often wasted or counterproductive; (ii) generates the Dutch-disease (iii) enables the central 
government to drain resources from the private sector (Snyder, 1996)
1
. However, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that donors are concerned about how their aid is used, especially 
how it affects the fiscal behavior of recipient governments (Morrissey, 2012). Morrissey has 
reviewed the effects of aid and concluded that aid significantly affects government spending and 
tax effort in LDCs.  
 Our main contribution to the literature is twofold. On the one hand, we propose an 
endogenous theory of aid and on the other hand provide empirical validity for the proposed 
theory. The model we propose postulates that the positive effect of aid reduces that burden of the 
taxation system on the private sector which ultimately leads to economic growth in poor 
countries, especially when the amount of aid is high and the public sector is less effective. In 
essence, the goal of the study is to examine how aid affects private investment through fiscal 
policy channels. We postulate that the effects of aid on tax effort and government spending as 
                         
1
 For instance Snyder (1996) has concluded from a panel of 36 developing countries that nations which receive large 
aid allocations are associated with lower levels of private investment.  
 4 
suggested by Morrissey (2012) could provide incentives for private investments and fixed capital 
formation, which are essential for economic prosperity. 
 In addition to the above contributions, the paper has policy implications in a number of 
areas. First, the global economic downturn has resurfaced issues about donors’: (i) continued 
willingness ‘to give’ and (ii) commitment to development assistance (Ahmed et al., 2011). 
Therefore, investigating the effect of aid on investment could provide additional insights into the 
ongoing debate
2
. Second, a corollary of the first contribution is the shifting of policy- space to 
foreign aid alternatives from East Asia. Accordingly, the ability to learn from the East Asian 
success stories has been substantially hampered by an asymmetric bargaining power between 
Africa and her Western development partners
3
. Third, there have been considerable shifts in the 
objectives announced by the donor community which have evolved from intensive 
industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more recent poverty-reduction objectives 
such the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Fourth, by using comparatively more recent 
data (1996-2010) from 53 countries, we provide an updated account of the nexuses. Moreover, 
the richness of our dataset also avails room for more policy implications. Accordingly, in order 
to add subtlety to the analysis, we disaggregate the dataset into fundamental characteristics of 
investment (legal origins, petroleum-exporting quality, political instability/conflicts, regional 
proximity, income-levels, religious-domination and openness to sea). 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents controversial views in 
the literature before proposing the endogenous theory. The data and methodology are discussed 
in Section 3. The empirical analysis is covered by Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Foreign aid and development  
Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs 
that were instituted over five decades ago have led to widely debated and unsolved issues 
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 The debate has recently been reframed by Koechlin (2007) who has examined three ambitious book (Sachs's The 
End of Poverty, Bhagwati's In Defense of Globalization, and Easterly's The Elusive Quest for Growth) and 
concluded that, the insights and drawbacks of underlying books remind us that the ‘status quo’ is not working. The 
author has concluded that a rich understanding of globalization and development requires a serious reconsideration 
of alternative visions of each phenomenon. For instance, new ways of theorizing development in light of the 
globalized system of food production has involved the European Union heavily criticizing the USA-led ‘genetically 
modified food aid’ program to the Southern African region (Herrick, 2008).  
3
 As a case in point, China’s policy in Africa of non-interference in development assistance and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is perceived as better alternatives (Asongu & Ssozi, 2015). Hence, the results of this study could 
either confirm or reject the narrative.  
 5 
surrounding aid effectiveness. In 2005, Western countries devoted substantial efforts to save 
Africa. In July of this year, the Group of Eight (G8) agreed to double development assistance to 
Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion in order to finance the ‘Big push’, as well as cancel 
Africa’s aid-loans contracted during previous attempts at a ‘Big push’. According to most 
estimates, prior to this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region in the world. 
World leaders gathered at the United Nations in September 2005 to further discuss progress 
towards mitigating poverty on the continent. As far as we have reviewed, Easterly (2005) best 
highlights some frustrating statistics. Accordingly, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) contains more than 
11% of the world’s population but only accounts for 1% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). In the median African country, 43% of the population survives on less than $1 per day. 
On the list of the World Food Program, of the twenty-three countries with more than thirty-five 
per cent of malnourished population, seventeen (seventy-three per cent) are in Africa. Poverty 
has been sustained by the long and brutal civil wars in many countries (Angola, Chad, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Liberia…etc), Rwanda’s genocide and recent carnages in Darfur-Sudan: with 
the Democratic Republic of Congo registering the world’s highest casualties since World War 2. 
To put these stylized facts into greater perspective, eight of the eleven recent cases of total 
societal breakdown into anarchy have been in Africa, namely in: Angola, Burundi, Liberia, 
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Libya (beside 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria). As a means of reconstructing these war-torn countries, foreign aid 
would obviously be considered as a ‘Big economic push’. 
 
2. 1 Controversial views in the literature 
While development assistance is necessary in the short-run owing to associated 
precarious circumstances (e.g. humanitarian concerns), there has been a heated debate on the 
effectiveness of aid on the one hand and linkages between aid, conditionality
4
 and economic 
policies in recipient countries on the other hand. In international policy coordination, one of the 
most debated and controversial issue is foreign aid. A strand of protagonists has engaged the 
debate with a mixture of alleged altruism, economic interests, geo-strategic considerations and 
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 The conditionality oriented debate has recently intensified when some Western governments (British and US for 
instance) have threatened to cut-off aid from some African countries because of the prosecution of gays, lesbians 
and transsexuals by governments of recipient countries. In response, activists, analysts and African government 
officials have viewed the threat as an insult to African values in particular and moral wellbeing in general.  
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historical ties (Alam, 2004). The post-decolonization period has been characterized by 
substantial increase in grants and soft loans from Western donor agencies and governments 
(Oya, 2006). In essence, the Cold war and the battle for geopolitical control of Africa between 
superpowers are considered by many scholars as the most important determinants of foreign aid 
which  increased sharply in the 1980s (Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). The 
debate has also been extended to policies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
5
.  
 We will now discuss the major strands of the debate on the development outcomes of 
foreign aid. A substantial bulk of the literature has been devoted to the macroeconomic 
consequences of development assistance. However, mixed results have been reported and studies 
that have concluded on a significant and positive effect have faced heavy methodological 
criticisms. Inconclusive results with recently refined methodologies, heavy reliance on empirical 
evidence and the absence of analytical frameworks (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005), have left much 
room for debate on the aid-development nexus. Table 1 summarizes the debate in two main 
strands. Whereas the first strand acknowledges the positive sides of development assistance, the 
second sustains the negative consequences of aid. 
 Among studies in the first strand, we shall highlight that of Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
which has concluded that aid could be effective when policies are appealing (conducive). The 
Burnside and Dollar study has received abundant comments from scholars and policy makers 
(Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Collier & Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003) with some claiming 
that corresponding findings are extremely data-dependent (Clemens et al., 2004). Whereas 
Clemens et al. (2004) have established that aid is beneficial in the short-term; Minou and Reddy 
(2010) have recently found that the beneficial effect could also be in the long-term. Gomanee et 
al. (2003) have emphasized that development assistance has both a direct effect on welfare and 
an indirect impact through public spending on social services. The indirect stance has been 
further consolidated by Mosley et al. (2004) on wellbeing and poverty in recipient countries. 
Development assistance has also been found to promote institutions in terms of its role on 
corruption (Okada & Samreth, 2012) and transition to democracy (Resnick, 2012).  
                         
5
  Accordingly, structural adjustment policies by the IMF have also been criticized. There is a wealth of literature 
documenting that the IMF’s neoliberal policies have not been: (i) sound for South Korean development after the 
1997 crisis (Crotty & Lee, 2002, 2006, 2009); (ii) the principal cause of the Argentinean crisis in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Levy & Duménil, 2006) and (iii) responsible for the failed privatization projects across Africa (Bartels 
et al., 2009).  
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 The second strand is research that finds an insignificant effect of aid on investment, 
savings and institutions. For example, it concludes that aid promotes unproductive public 
consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without a positive effect on investment. The latter stance has 
been sustained by Reichel (1995) and Boone (1996). Whereas Ghura (1995) has emphasized the 
negative impact of development assistance on domestic savings, Pedersen (1996) has established 
that foreign aid distorts development and leads to aid-dependency. In direct response to the 
Okada and Samreth (2012) position on a negative aid-corruption nexus, recent African aid 
literature has supported this second strand from an institutional standpoint. Accordingly, Asongu 
(2012a, 2013a) has engaged in a debate on the ‘effect of foreign aid on corruption’6.  
 
Table 1: Summary of controversial views in the literature  
Researchers Main findings 
 
First-strand: Aid improves growth (development) 
 
Ghura (1995) Aid positively impacts savings for good adjusters.  
  
Burnside & Dollar (2000) Aid can be good when economic management and policies are appealing. 
  
Guillaumont  &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is conditional on environmental factors (hazards and shocks). 
  
Collier & Dehn (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid 
conditional on negative supply shocks is better than a targeting based on good 
policies.  
  
 
Collier & Dollar (2001) 
The positive impact of aid on poverty depends on its effect on per-capita 
income growth and the effect of per-capita income growth on poverty 
mitigation. 
  
 
Feeny (2003) 
The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly 
in line with a strategy to effectively mitigate poverty and increase human 
well being.  
  
Gomanee et al. (2003) Aid has both a direct impact on welfare and indirect effect via public spending 
on social services.  
  
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-run appealing impact on growth. 
  
Ishfaq (2004) Though in a limited way, aid has helped in reducing the extent of poverty in 
Pakistan. 
  
Mosley et al. (2004) Aid has an indirect impact on wellbeing and poverty in recipient countries. 
  
Addison et al. (2005) Aid augments pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive impact on 
economic prosperity. Aid broadly works to reduce poverty, and poverty would 
be higher in the absence of aid. 
  
                         
6
 Whereas Okada and Samreth (2012) have concluded that aid mitigates corruption in developing countries, Asongu 
(2012a) in response has established that the Okada and Samreth (2012) findings may not be relevant for Africa 
because aid fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) on the continent.  In response to some informal 
discussions that the Okada and Samreth and Asongu (2012a) findings are not directly comparable, Asongu (2013a) 
has maintained his position in the African context without partially negating the empirical underpinnings of Okada 
and Samreth on the one hand and extending the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight government quality 
variables.  
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Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development objectives.  
  
Minou & Reddy (2010) Aid positively impacts economic prosperity in the long-run. 
  
Okada & Samreth (2012)  Aid mitigates corruption.  
  
Resnick (2012) Aid has promoted democratic transitions in the 1990s in African countries.  
  
  
Second-strand: Aid does not lead to growth (development) 
  
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid promotes unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth. 
  
Reichel (1995) Aid does not encourage savings because of the substitution effect. 
  
Ghura (1995) Aid has a negative incidence on savings. 
  
 
Boone (1996)  
Aid is insignificant in promoting economic development on two main counts: 
poverty is not the effect of capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians 
to adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows. 
  
Pedersen (1996) Aid distorts development and eventually leads to aid dependency. 
  
Asongu (2012a)  Aid fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption). 
  
Asongu & Nwachukwu (2015)  Aid has a negative nexus with government quality dynamics.  
  
Asongu (2013a) Aid is unappealing to institutional quality irrespective of initial levels of 
institutional development.  
  
Asongu (2014a) Aid leads to less pro-poor development.  
  
Source (Authors) 
 
 
 It is also important to devote space to engaging some studies on the development 
outcomes of foreign aid that have established alternative conclusions to the two main strands 
summarised in Table 1. These include research on the impact of aid on growth and changes in 
recipient policies. Hansen and Tarp (2001) conclude that whereas the effect of development 
assistance on economic growth may not be contingent on ‘good policy’, human capital could be 
the driving factor behind economic prosperity. The narrative is in accordance with a recent 
strand of literature on soft economics (i.e. the human side of economic activities) (Kuada, 2015) 
and knowledge economy (Asongu, 2015a; Tchamyou, 2015; Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016). 
Furthermore, the emphasis on human capital is consistent with another recent stream of African 
development literature on the benefits of foreign aid in economic growth (Kargbo & Sen, 2014; 
Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2014) because the corresponding positive impact on economic 
growth is more apparent when development assistance is channeled through educational 
mechanisms (Asiedu & Nandwa, 2007; Asiedu, 2014). 
Easterly (2003) has criticized the Burnside and Dollar (2000) model by establishing that 
while foreign aid may stimulate growth when correct policies are implemented, the data shows 
that the linkage between aid and recipients’ policies is weak. The issue of exclusive growth in 
 9 
Africa which has motivated a book by Kuada (2015) has also been the motivation behind another 
book by Fosu (2015ab) which is devoted to elucidating: (i) myths behind Africa’s recent growth 
resurgence and (ii) the role of institutions in the underlying growth resurgence
7
.  The concern 
about institutions is important because Bräutigam and Knack (2004) have concluded that high 
aid to Africa is linked to deteriorating governance and tax levels. The conclusions of Bräutigam 
and Knack (2004) on weak governance and low tax income are respectively in accordance with 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) and Asongu (2015b) who have used more updated data. 
According to Bräutigam and Knack (2004), growth in GDP per capita is more linked to 
improvements in governance, as opposed to foreign aid.   
Whereas the effect of development assistance is more straight forward to some scholars 
(Ishfaq, 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006)
8
, its impact on development outcomes 
may also be indirect. We have highlighted in one of the strands above that aid promotes unsound 
public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without a positive effect on investment. We have also 
highlighted in the introduction that aid affects development objectives through fiscal behavior 
channels (Morrissey, 2012). Therefore ‘aid effects’ on tax effort and government spending could 
provide incentives for the investment needed for economic prosperity.  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical proposition: fiscal behavior as a transmission mechanism 
2.2.1 Theoretical and empirical underpinnings   
 The theoretical underpinnings of the fiscal behavior channel in the aid-development 
nexus are broadly consistent with the ‘Big-Push’ model which maintains that Africa is poor 
because it is stuck in a poverty trap (Easterly, 2005). In order to emerge from the poverty pit, it 
needs a substantial aid-driven investment policy: a ‘Big Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and 
Solow growth models have been based on this intuition. Accordingly, the underlying assumption 
                         
7
 The narrative of Kuada (2015) on soft economics for employment, poverty alleviation and inclusive growth in 
Africa is substantiated by a recent stream of African development literature that has focused on mechanisms by 
which foreign aid can be tailored more effectively towards reducing poverty and boosting employment (Jones & 
Tarp, 2015; Simpasa et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2015; Page & Shimeles, 2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015; Asongu, 
2015c). 
8
 Addison et al. (2005) have established that development assistance encourages pro-poor public spending and has a 
positive effect on economic prosperity (growth) since it broadly aligns with poverty reduction. Their position that 
poverty would be higher in the absence of aid had earlier been raised by Ishfaq (2004). Among proponents of a 
positive aid-development nexus in the first strand of Table 1, Fielding et al. (2004) have been the most optimistic in 
their conclusion that aid has a straight forward positive effect on development objectives. 
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for the intuition is that, the ‘Big-Push’ is destined to bridge the saving-investment gap poor 
countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005).  
 In light of the summary of the literature presented in Section 2.1, our model will 
incorporate two channels for the influence of foreign aid: the investment destination of aid and 
the fiscal behavior mechanism as a channel to the investment. Hence, the goal of the present 
study is to: (i) propose an endogenous theory of aid and (ii) test the empirical validity of the 
proposed theory. In essence, we examine how aid affects private investment (and gross fixed 
capital formation) through tax efforts and government spending. The model is primarily based on 
the assumption that private investment and/or gross fixed capital formation are relevant for 
economic prosperity.  
 
2.2.2 Theoretical proposition: extension of Barro (1990)  
 There is a wealth of literature substantiating that the taxation system adopted by a 
developing country creates large distortions that substantially affect the dynamics of the private 
sector and hence economic growth and development (Manly et al., 2006; Feredeand & Dahlby, 
2012). As highlighted earlier, some of this vast literature has focused on the channels via which 
foreign aid affects economic prosperity in recipient countries (see Table 1). In the same vein, 
recent endogenous growth literature has elucidated the positive role of public spending, notably, 
in: education, health and infrastructure for economic growth (Alexiou, 2009).  The underlying 
literature substantially draws from the Barro (1990) model.  
 In essence, Barro determines the optimal size of the State: public expenditure that 
maximizes the rate of economic growth. The simple growth model does not take into account the 
issue of budget deficit allocated to public spending. Hence, it is intuitively relevant to propose a 
model that incorporates development assistance destined to financing productive public 
expenditure. Therefore, the idea here is to extend Barro’s simple growth model while taking into 
consideration the effect of foreign aid on private investment through the fiscal behavior of the 
State. From Barro’s theoretical underpinnings, we suppose that productive investments may 
either be private investments or gross fixed capital formations that ultimately have positive 
effects on economic growth.  
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 We consider a model similar to Barro (1990). The economy is characterized by the 
decision of a household representative agent who is a consumer and a producer with the 
following production function: 
gAky  1                                                 (1) 
where k is physical capital, g the amount of composite productive public expenditure including: 
education, infrastructure and health. This public expenditure is financed by taxes and an 
allocation to foreign aid. That is: 
 Ayg                                                         (2) 
where A is the amount of international aid which is indexed on national income and we suppose 
that it is determined in an exogenous manner.  
 For the purpose of simplicity, we further assume that the budget of the State is at 
equilibrium at every moment. Accordingly, the problem of our representative agent is to solve 
the dynamic program of decentralized economic growth given by:  
dt
tc
c
Max .
t-
e 0 1
11)(
  







                                                         (3) 
Subject to: 
0.k(0)
ay(t)A(t)
A(t)y(t)g(t)
c(t) -  y(t))   - 1()(





tk
 
where  c(.)  represents  per  capita  consumption,   is  the constant inter-temporal  elasticity  of  
substitution ,    is the constant rate of  time preference and a is the indexation rate of foreign aid 
allocated to the production of social infrastructure g(.) . This rate is exogenous, fixed and 
considered as ‘given’ by national economic agents.   
 We have already seen that a substantial bulk of the literature has focused on the effect of 
aid on growth and development. The theoretical and empirical relevance of aid to public 
spending has also been shown. Now we suppose that the objective of donor(s) vis-à-vis poor 
countries is the development of the private sector (liberal aspect of the contract). Hence, its 
(their) aid is supposed to be entirely and observably allocated directly to the financing of 
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productive public spending, which can be lacking in poor countries. Hence, the role of aid is to 
provide socio-economic infrastructure which improves private sector effectiveness. Within this 
framework, it can be established that the equation for budget equilibrium is given this time by:  
  )()(
)()()(
tyatg
tgtayty




                                        (4) 
In the presence of foreign aid allocated for private sector promotion, while acknowledging that 
aid as an exogenous factor, public decision makers should therefore implement an endogenous 
economic growth program by the optimal choice of the income-related direct tax structure. 
Hence, taking the government's decisions as given, the representative agent chooses 
consumption, c, and capital, k, to maximize his/her welfare:  
  
dt
tc
c
Max .
t-
e 0 1
11)(
  







                                                                    (5)        
Subject to: 
0.k(0)
y(t))(g(t)
c(t) -  y(t))   - 1()(



a
tk


  
 
Proposition 1:  
In the presence of foreign aid: 
i) the economic growth rate is given by the following rate:      
               
          










 ρα1
α
τ)τ)(a-(1α-1
1
A   
σ
1
      a                             (6) 
 
ii) The tax rate that maximizes national economic growth is therefore given by: 
   
a
a
a


1
     0    )1(                                      (7) 
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It is immediately observable that the positive effect of aid reduces that burden of the taxation 
system on the private sector of poor countries, especially when the amount of aid is high and the 
public sector less effective. Hence, it is apparent that aid granted to developing countries directly 
benefits them in terms of private sector dynamism which ultimately leads to economic growth 
while reducing the size of the national public sector (Remmer, 2004; Payne & Kumazawa, 
2005).  
  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. Limitation to the time span is 
motivated by the interest of providing results with updated and more focused policy 
implications. Moreover, the focus on Africa and the time span enable follow-up of a recent 
foreign aid debate that has had some influence in academic and policy making circles
9
. The 
dependent variables are private investment and gross fixed capital formation. While the former is 
used in baseline regressions, the latter is employed for robustness checks.   
 
3.1.1 Determination of fundamental characteristics 
 It is important to discuss the determination of fundamental characteristics which are 
crucial for the relevance of the empirics. Macroeconomic characteristics have the limitation of 
being time-dynamic. Thus, the same non-dummy threshold may not be consistent over time. This 
justification is even more relevant when short-run (business cycle) disturbances loom 
substantially. Hence, we are consistent with recent comparative literature in categorizing 
countries in terms of conflict-affected (or political instability), petroleum-exporting, legal 
origins, income-levels, regional proximity, religious-domination and landlockedness (Weeks, 
2012; Asongu, 2014b). From intuition, foreign aid, private investment and fiscal policy 
substantially depend on the above categories. 
                         
9
 The time span is consistent with those employed by Okada and Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a) and Asongu 
(2013a) in the highlighted debate. The first authors have use data from 120 developing countries for the period 
1995-2009, the second has used data from 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010 whereas the third has used 
data for the period 1996-2010 from 53 African countries.  
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 It is difficult to establish an objective definition of a conflict country. Since, few 
countries on the continent are completely conflict-free, the distinction is made on the basis of 
degree of significance of conflict-span, relative to the period of study. Based on the information 
(53 countries over the period 1996-2010), two categories emerge: civil wars and political strife. 
With respect to the first category on civil wars, few would object to the inclusion of Angola 
(1975-2002), Burundi (1993-2005), Chad (2005-2010), the Central African Republic (series of 
failed coup d’états between 1996-2003 and the 2004-2007 Bush War), the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire (1999 coup d’état, 2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 2011), Liberia 
(1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Somalia and Sudan. For the second category, in spite of 
the absence of some formal characteristics of civil war, we also include Nigeria and Zimbabwe 
due to the severity of their internal strife.  
 Second, on how to determine petroleum countries, a critical categorical objection arises 
because some petroleum countries also clearly qualify as conflict-affected (Angola and Sudan 
for instance). In this study a country may fall into many categories if it has the relevant 
categorical characteristics. Another concern that emerges is arbitrariness if a country qualifies for 
only part of the time period, either because of: (i) a recent discovery of oil fields or (ii) a 
substantial decline in production. In the same vein, another objection could be that some 
resource-rich countries (e.g. Botswana) display macroeconomic features that are similar to those 
of petroleum-exporting countries because of intensive extractive industries. We take a 
minimalistic approach to the issue by strictly adhering to the petroleum category and including 
only countries whose exports have been oil-dominated for over a decade during the span 1996-
2010. These include: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan.  
 Third, the basis of legal origin is founded on the premise that legal origins place different 
emphasis on private property rights vis-à-vis State power (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). 
According to this narrative, English common law countries place more emphasis on private 
property rights, whereas French civil law focuses more on State power. The intuition for this 
category as discussed in prior work accords with African institutional quality (Asongu, 2015d) 
and property rights (Asongu, 2012b) literature. The underlying logic for this segmentation is that 
the institutional web of formal rules, informal norms and enforcement characteristics affect the 
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climate of investment. The legal origin classification is according to La Porta et al. (2008, p. 
289).  
 Fourth, the basis for including income-levels to examine wealth-effects is founded on two 
premises. On the one hand, economic prosperity could be associated with higher levels of private 
investment. On the other hand, recent African institutional literature has shown that wealth-
effects matter in institutional quality (Asongu, 2012c; 2013b) that ultimately determines 
investment. The choice of income-levels is in accordance with the Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank.  
 Fifth, there is an investment cost of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007). Moreover, in 
order to add subtlety to the analysis for more policy implications, we include: (i) religious 
dominations (Christianity and Islam) in accordance with the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(2011) World Fact book and (ii) regional proximity consisting of SSA and North African 
countries.  
 
 
3.1.2 Endogenous explaining, instrumental and control variables  
 The fiscal policy measures of government expenditure and tax revenues are consistent 
with the discussed literature. The instrumental variables include: Total Net Official Development 
Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD), NODA from the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) countries and Grants excluding technical cooperation. We employ 
only two control variables due to constraints in degrees of freedom required for the Sargan over-
identifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity
10
. The control variables are corruption 
and ‘voice and accountability’ and are included to reduce the degree of identification when 
development assistance instruments are not valid.  The choice of the control variables from 
African Development Indicators of the World Bank is consistent with recent African institutional 
literature (Asongu, 2012a, 2013a). These institutional variables are determinants of a country’s 
investment climate.   
 Variable definitions (with corresponding data sources) are provided in Table 2, whereas  
Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively provide details about the summary 
statistics, correlation matrix (showing the basic correlations between key variables used in this 
paper) and categorization of countries.   
                         
10
 Please see last paragraph of Section 3.2 for further insights.  
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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Corruption  Control  
Index  
CC “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Voice & Accountability 
 
V&A 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent 
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and a free media”. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Ex Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Tax Revenue  Tax rev. Tax Revenue (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Fixed Capital Formation   GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Investment  Priv. Ivt Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (1) Total  Aid Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (2) DAC Aid NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (3) DAC Aid NODA from Multilateral Donors (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Grants  Grants  Grants excluding technical cooperation (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The study uses a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
strategy for a twofold reason: the empirical strategy is consistent with the problem statement and 
also addresses the issue of endogeneity. The adopted IV procedure is in accordance with recent 
foreign aid (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015) and development (Tchamyou, 2015) literature. The 
purpose of adopting an IV approach is to have some bite on endogeneity. Moreover, the line of 
inquiry is consistent with an IV technique essentially because, the study aims to assess how 
foreign aid instruments affect investment through mechanisms of fiscal behavior. The following 
steps are adopted in the estimation procedure. 
  
First-stage regression:  
 itit sInstrumentFB )(10  it                                      (1)                                                                                                          
Second-stage regression:   
 itit FBInvestment )(10  itiX   it                   (2)           
In Eq. (2), X is a set of control variables which include: Corruption and ‘voice and 
accountability’. FB entails Fiscal behavior which consists of Government’s final consumption 
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expenditure and Tax revenues. Investment denotes Private investment and Fixed capital 
formation. Instrumental variables include: Total NODA, NODA from DAC countries, NODA 
from MD and Grants. In Eq. (1) and Eq (2),  v  and u, respectively represent the error terms.  
In the estimation process, three main steps are adopted. First, we justify the choice of the 
IV procedure with a Hausman test for endogeneity. Then, we verify that the instruments are 
exogenous to the endogenous components of the independent variables (government expenditure 
and tax revenues). Last, we ensure that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated with error term 
in the equation of interest with an OIR test. Further robustness checks are ensured with: (i) 
restricted and unrestricted modeling; (ii) modeling with robust Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and (iii) use of two investment indicators.  
As highlighted in Section 3.1, we employ only two control variables due to constraints in 
degrees of freedom required for the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. The Sargan OIR test 
is only applicable in the presence of over-identification. In other words, the instruments must be 
higher than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases 
of exact-identification (instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-
identification (instruments less than endogenous explaining variables) the OIR test is by 
definition impossible. Accordingly, we have four foreign aid instruments and cannot model with 
more than three endogenous explaining variables. 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results 
 In this section, we aim to assess two main issues: (i) the ability of the exogenous 
components of fiscal behavior to explain private investment and (ii) the ability of the instruments 
to explain private investment through the proposed fiscal policy channels. Whereas the first 
concern is addressed by the significances and signs of estimated coefficients, the second issue is 
tackled with the Sargan OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that the aid 
instruments explain private investment only through the fiscal policy channels. Therefore, a 
rejection of the null hypothesis is a rejection of the perspective that the foreign aid instruments 
do not explain private investment beyond the proposed mechanisms. We also employ a Hausman 
test to account for endogeneity and justify the choice of the 2SLS-IV estimation strategy. The 
null hypothesis of this test is the position that estimated coefficients by OLS are consistent and 
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efficient. Thus, failure to reject this null hypothesis does not justify the choice of the estimation 
strategy since it undermines the concern of endogeneity. In light of the problem statement and 
theoretical background, the Hausman test is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
employment of the 2SLS-IV strategy. Therefore, even in the absence of endogeneity (failure to 
reject the null of the Hausman test), we still employ the IV procedure.  
 In Table 3 below, we report a summary of findings from Tables 4-5. While Table 4 is the 
baseline assessment with private investment, Table 5 is a robustness check with fixed capital 
formation. Modeling is restricted (Panel A) and unrestricted (Panel B) in both tables. While 
Tables 4-5 examine both the first and second concerns highlighted above, Table 3 is based on 
only the second concern. Accordingly, given the problem statement, the second issue is more 
relevant than the first because it is premised on evidence from the first concern. In other words, 
while addressing the first issue does not guarantee the second can be tackled, examining the 
second is feasible when the first has been confirmed. Therefore, the summary in Table 3 is based 
on the following information criteria, the : (i) estimated coefficient should be significant; (ii) 
adjusted coefficient of determination (R²) should not be negative; (iii) Fisher statistics should be 
significant; (iv) null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test for the validity of the foreign aid 
instruments should not be rejected  and (v) Hausman test has an informational role and is not 
indispensible for the validity of the 2SLS-IV model specification.  
 From Table 3, the following broad conclusions could be established. (1) Foreign aid 
overwhelmingly increases private investment and gross capital formation through tax effort, 
which is consistent with theoretical underpinnings of and propositions in the study. (2) While the 
effect of foreign aid on the dependent variables through government expenditure is a bit mixed, 
the weight of available evidence on the second issue broadly supports its positive impacts on 
private investment and gross fixed capital formation. (3) It could be further inferred that while 
the ‘tax effort effect’ is consistent across fundamental characteristics of investment, the 
‘government spending impact’ may change as one move from one fundamental characteristic to 
another. Hence, whereas the homogeneity on the tax effort mechanism strongly confirms our 
theoretical hypothesis, the heterogeneity of the government spending channel indicates that 
generalization of the findings with respect of the government expenditure mechanism should be 
treated with caution.  (4) Our findings are more relevant for restricted than for unrestricted 
modeling. This is an indication that autonomous investment is not a very valid channel through 
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which foreign aid is instrumental in private investment. (5) Given the overwhelming presence of 
‘not applicable’ (na)11 and degree (°)12 signs, it is difficult to establish significant asymmetries in 
various dimensions of common fundamental characteristics. Therefore, evidence of wealth-
effect, legal-origin-effect…. landlocked-effect cannot be feasibly drawn.  (6) But for a thin 
exception (conflict-affected countries), most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs: ‘voice and accountability’ and corruption-control are logical incentives for 
private investors because they improve the climate of doing business.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                         
11
 insignificant estimate or variable not included in model.  
12
 °: negative coefficient of determination, significant Sargan OIR test (invalid instruments) or insignificant Fisher 
statistics. 
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Table 3: Summary of results 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Landlocked(LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
  
 Panel A: Specifications in Panel A of Table 3 (Restricted Private Investment Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  - na na na + na + -° + -° +° + -° + + na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  + +° + + + +° + +° + +° na + na + + + + 
                  
 Panel B: Specifications in Panel B of Table 3 (Unrestricted Private Investment Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  na na na na na na na na na na + na na na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  na na na na + na na na na + + na + na + na na 
                  
                  
 Panel C: Specifications in Panel A of Table 4 (Restricted Fixed Capital Formation Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  - na na na + -° na - + -° + + - + + na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  + +° + + + +° + + + +° + + na + + +° + 
                  
                  
 Panel D: Specifications in Panel B of Table 4 (Unrestricted Fixed Capital Formation Modeling)   
Gov. Exp.  na na na na na na na na na na + na na na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  na + na na + na na + na + + na + na na na na 
                  
Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Tax Rev: Tax Revenue. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. 
English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  
NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political 
instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Dom: Domination. na: insignificant estimate or variable not included in model. °: negative 
coefficient of determination, significant Sargan OIR test (invalid instruments) or insignificant Fisher statistics. +(-): positive (negative) effect.  
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Table 4: Baseline Assessment with Private Investment (HAC standard errors) 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Restricted Modeling  
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
Gov. Exp.  -0.60** 1.064 1.951 0.301 0.475** 0.004 1.062* -0.43** 1.003* -1.32** 0.385* 0.894* -0.128** 0.977* 0.673*** 0.506 -0.310 
 (0.016) (0.325) (0.270) (0.446) (0.046) (0.983) (0.097) (0.011) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.070) (0.031) (0.070) (0.000) (0.354) (0.862) 
Tax Rev. 0.66*** 0.568** 0.512* 0.822*** 0.52*** 1.16*** 0.567*** 0.84*** 0.55*** 2.10*** 0.154 0.58*** 0.066 0.643*** 0.504*** 0.919*** 0.475** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.000) (0.751) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
C. Control 4.383 6.888 --- --- -0.164 9.567 --- --- --- --- --- --- -5.07*** --- --- --- -18.134 
 (0.752) (0.492)   (0.972) (0.103)       (0.000)    (0.369) 
Voice & A. --- --- 17.69** --- --- --- 2.710 -1.469 --- 22.60** --- --- --- 2.966 --- 14.728** --- 
   (0.029)    (0.828) (0.733)  (0.013)    (0.793)  (0.041)  
                  
Hausman  67.6*** 18.37*** 51.87*** 19.88*** 45.5*** 17.9*** 56.78*** 35.0*** 38.0*** 57.5*** 0.035 34.7*** 110*** 46.60*** 10.58*** 32.40*** 84.39*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.982) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.425 14.29*** 1.210 1.538 1.391 6.74** 1.035 1.354 3.768 0.294 7.594* 4.484 0.381 3.007 2.598 3.138 2.074 
 (0.808) (0.000) (0.545) (0.673) (0.498) (0.034) (0.595) (0.508) (0.287) (0.862) (0.055) (0.213) (0.826) (0.222) (0.457) (0.208) (0.354) 
Adjusted R² 0.215 0.203 0.110 0.032 0.083 0.251 0.073 -0.061 0.054 -0.074 0.878 0.073 -0.101 0.088 0.123 0.147 0.115 
Chi-Square --- --- --- 147*** --- --- ---  91.7*** --- 14391*** 120*** --- --- 113*** --- --- 
Fisher  152*** 45.07*** 23.73*** ---- 107*** 40.7*** 20.13*** 34.2*** --- 46.6*** --- --- 2e^4*** 26.06*** --- 22.40*** 16.75*** 
Observations 34 51 87 77 72 72 111 35 155 26  8 176 13 140 57 103  
                  
 Panel B: Unrestricted Modeling  
Constant  63.22 21.83*** 16.06** 12.925 5.582** 15.7*** 20.405 11.6*** 12.843 43.4*** 7.414*** 13.340 -25.1*** 13.340 -9.278 17.29*** 14.294 
 (0.595) (0.000) (0.039) (0.207) (0.031) (0.003) (0.184) (0.000) (0.433) (0.003) (0.000) (0.335) (0.000) (0.335) (0.408) (0.004) (0.372) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.108 0.135 0.039 -0.028 0.179 -0.038 0.325 0.061 -0.105 --- 0.180*** -0.078 0.104 -0.078 -0.020 0.103 -0.501 
 (0.917) (0.840) (0.975) (0.890) (0.305) (0.874) (0.570) (0.783) (0.912)  (0.000) (0.917) (0.186) (0.917) (0.933) (0.771) (0.766) 
Tax Rev. -1.614 0.056 0.219 0.092 0.34*** 0.371 -0.212 0.140 -0.014 0.61*** 0.092*** 0.027 0.75*** 0.027 0.66*** 0.131 0.005 
 (0.718) (0.459) (0.361) (0.873) (0.000) (0.200) (0.714) (0.565) (0.982) (0.000) (0.000) (0.959) (0.000) (0.959) (0.000) (0.680) (0.991) 
C. Control  -7.935 20.55*** --- --- -1.549 13.8*** --- -2.309 -6.986 --- --- -4.247 -18.1*** -4.247 -17.347 --- -7.932 
 (0.578) (0.000)   (0.496) (0.005)  (0.729) (0.459)   (0.637) (0.000) (0.637) (0.166)  (0.643) 
Voice & A. --- --- 15.51** 2.062 --- --- 6.749 --- --- 44.6*** --- --- --- --- --- 13.49*** --- 
   (0.014) (0.526)   (0.532)   (0.009)      (0.000)  
                  
Hausman  33.5*** 6.758* 27.76*** 0.988 4.854 2.948 9.767** 2.007 7.002* 15.8*** 4.719* 4.359 90.40*** 4.359 9.713** 12.18*** 4.254 
 (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.804) (0.182) (0.399) (0.020) (0.570) (0.071) (0.000) (0.094) (0.225) (0.000) (0.225) (0.021) (0.000) (0.235) 
Sargan OIR 0.013 1.033 1.110 1.134 1.641 1.132 1.365 1.240 2.725* 1.076 1.514 3.027* 0.004 3.027* 0.773 0.160 1.326 
 (0.907) (0.309) (0.292) (0.286) (0.200) (0.287) (0.242) (0.265) (0.098) (0.583) (0.468) (0.081) (0.945) (0.081) (0.379) (0.688) (0.249) 
Adjusted R² -0.065 0.494 0.109 -0.024 0.052 0.273 0.029 -0.006 0.181 0.150 0.818 0.150 0.395 0.150 0.009 0.127 0.138 
Chi-Square --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  14.0*** 42.97*** 2.409* 0.525 7.92*** 4.25*** 0.450 0.768 0.421 31.9*** 155*** 0.176 72.74*** 0.176 20.12*** 4.565*** 0.090 
Observations 34 51 87 59 72 72 111 35 118 26 8 138 13 138 42 103 144 
                  
Instruments  Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants 
                  
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 
LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated 
countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no 
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significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Gov. Exp: 
Government Expenditure. Voice & A: Voice & Accountability. Tax Rev: Tax Revenues.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. NODA: Net 
Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: 
NODA from Multilateral Donors. The relevance of bold values that depict the information criteria is threefold. 1) Rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test for the presence of endogeneity. 2) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 3) The failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. 
 
Table 5: Robust Assessment with Fixed Capital Formation (HAC standard errors) 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Restricted Modeling 
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
                  
Gov. Exp.  -0.59* 1.366 2.328 0.957 0.541** -0.267* 1.301 -0.4*** 1.833** -1.1*** 0.330* 1.589* -0.112** 1.574** 1.388*** 0.460 0.0349 
 (0.099) (0.229) (0.293) (0.265) (0.022) (0.086) (0.239) (0.000) (0.031) (0.009) (0.090) (0.036) (0.016) (0.025) (0.000) (0.504) (0.987) 
Tax Rev. 0.87*** 0.819*** 0.775** 1.10*** 0.75*** 1.29*** 0.69*** 1.42*** 0.72*** 1.75*** 0.47*** 0.808*** 0.255 0.784* 0.69*** 1.291*** 0.662*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
C. Control  4.956 8.550 --- --- -2.740 -2.196 --- --- --- --- --- --- -5.03*** --- --- --- -23.717 
 (0.000) (0.555)   (0.601) (0.885)       (0.000)    (0.351) 
Voice & A. --- --- 18.691** --- --- --- -8.026 3.475 --- 7.467 --- --- --- -1.407 --- 16.26** --- 
   (0.045)    (0.719) (0.641)  (0.103)    (0.941)  (0.047)  
                  
Hausman  58.4*** 31.97*** 59.21*** 48.28*** 71.9*** 25.8*** 84.99*** 70.5*** 83.8*** 127*** 1.153 89.88*** 115*** 79.14*** 32.77*** 40.55*** 186*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.561) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.627 15.98*** 1.504 1.123 0.506 25.0*** 3.389 3.542 3.740 0.162 3.321 4.755 0.243 4.413 3.909 5.038* 2.831 
 (0.730) (0.000) (0.471) (0.771) (0.776) (0.000) (0.183) (0.170) (0.290) (0.921) (0.344) (0.190) (0.885) (0.110) (0.271) (0.080) (0.242) 
Adjusted R² 0.075 0.272 0.068 0.105 0.165 0.100 0.014 0.305 0.050 -0.052 0.872 0.081 -0.135 0.064 0.070 0.182 0.087 
Chi-Square  --- --- --- 104*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 6e^4**
* 
150*** --- --- 162*** 28.77*** --- 
Fisher  485*** 29.92*** 25.83*** --- 133*** 56.5*** 36.95*** 273*** 91.3*** 276*** --- --- 5e^4*** 51.07*** --- 40.55*** 25.05*** 
Observations 34 57 93 80 72 81 111 44 158 32 8 186 13 149 60 109 153 
                  
 Panel B: Unrestricted Modeling 
Constant  62.370 26.3*** 21.89** 3.831 6.996** 28.2*** 42.601 13.7*** 23.449 38.4*** 7.11*** 21.828 -19.4*** 21.828 11.966 24.76*** 23.127 
 (0.405) (0.000) (0.017) (0.915) (0.026) (0.000) (0.453) (0.000) (0.185) (0.002) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) (0.145) (0.244) (0.000) (0.157) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.106 -0.099 -0.358 0.555 0.170 -0.332 -0.237 -0.111 0.318 --- 0.13*** 0.146 0.067 0.146 0.033 -0.141 -0.217 
 (0.870) (0.870) (0.785) (0.191) (0.396) (0.279) (0.909) (0.175) (0.795)  (0.000) (0.889) (0.314) (0.889) (0.818) (0.717) (0.902) 
Tax Rev. -1.375 0.235* 0.381 0.747 0.52*** 0.088 -0.936 0.48*** -0.235 0.54*** 0.41*** -0.092 0.79*** -0.092 0.363 0.153 -0.125 
 (0.631) (0.074) (0.166) (0.723) (0.000) (0.794) (0.667) (0.000) (0.744) (0.000) (0.000) (0.878) (0.000) (0.878) (0.196) (0.628) (0.820) 
C. Control -7.194 27.1*** --- --- -4.476 15.187* --- -0.764 -2.976 ---- --- -3.778 -15.1*** -3.778 -5.617 --- -6.447 
 (0.676) (0.000)   (0.107) (0.067)  (0.828) (0.744)   (0.687) (0.000) (0.687) (0.536)  (0.645) 
Voice & A. --- --- 16.05** -6.247 --- --- 0.406 --- --- 27.9** --- --- --- --- --- 13.857** --- 
   (0.015) (0.624)   (0.987)   (0.036)      (0.017)  
                  
Hausman  27.0*** 18.34*** 36.09*** 5.545 8.400** 12.6*** 24.59*** 4.334 24.9*** 23.1*** 0.043 17.1*** 64.8*** 17.16*** 2.364 22.79*** 18.03*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.000) (0.978) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.500) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.265 0.170 1.209 1.451 0.025 2.604 1.679 0.054 2.692 0.328 3.532 3.005* 0.017 3.005 0.012 0.183 1.796 
 (0.606) (0.680) (0.271) (0.228) (0.874) (0.106) (0.194) (0.815) (0.100) (0.848) (0.171) (0.082) (0.896) (0.082) (0.909) (0.668) (0.180) 
Adjusted R² -0.099 0.573 0.074 0.002 0.132 0.289 0.146 0.319 0.045 0.370 0.937 0.127 0.310 0.127 0.132 0.108 0.248 
Chi-Square  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  1.096 28.41*** 2.535* 0.843 98.6*** 2.082 0.495 6.80*** 0.792 57.6*** 463*** 0.373 112*** 0.373 1.600 2.754** 0.266 
Observations  34 57 93 62 72 81 111 44 121 32 8 147 13 147 45 109 153 
                  
Instruments Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants 
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***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 
LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated 
countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no 
significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Gov. Exp: 
Government Expenditure. Voice & A: Voice & Accountability. Tax Rev: Tax Revenues.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. NODA: Net 
Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: 
NODA from Multilateral Donors. The relevance of bold values that depict the information criteria is threefold. 1) Rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test for the presence of endogeneity. 2) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 3) The failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. 
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4.2 Discussion of results, policy implications and caveats 
4.2.1 Discussion of results 
 From the weight of available empirical evidence (summarized in Table 3), we have found 
an overwhelming homogenous effect of tax effort on investment. Since the results are consistent 
with the proposed theory; the explanation for the positive nexus conditional on foreign aid has 
already been substantially covered in Section 2. Hence, the instrumentality or relevance of 
foreign aid in the positive nexus could be explained by the fact that development assistance 
reduces the tax effort of the government which provides additional incentives for private 
investment (either in terms of reinvested profits or improvements in the investment climate). The 
explanation extends to the formation of fixed capital (Table 5).  Another explanation to the 
positive relationship is that Western donor agencies could require tax institutions to be: (i) more 
accountable and (ii) not corrupt. Hence, the previously siphoned funds by corrupt officials are 
transferred to the private sector. A third elucidation to the positive nexus could be traceable to a 
lower composition of loans in the development assistance portfolio. This is especially the case 
with countries under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.  
 We have also found that the findings for the government expenditure channel are 
heterogeneous or not consistently positive across fundamental characteristics of private 
investment. The key idea to understanding this heterogeneity is that the degree by which corrupt 
officials chose to spend money on goods whose true value is hard to identify, may differ across 
fundamental characteristics. Hence, the negative nexus could be traceable to funds that are used 
for those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993). Accordingly, expenditure on military and high technology goods are some examples by 
which corrupt officials are provided with lucrative mismanagement opportunities.  Corruption 
and military spending have been found to be closely linked, especially in military aircraft (Hines, 
1995)
13
. On the other hand, the positive nexus could be attributed to expenditures that do not 
seem to provide any opportunities at all for corrupt officials and ultimately create favorable 
conditions for private investments. Expenditure in education is a case in point. For example, it 
may be difficult for a government official to collect bribes for the appointment of unqualified 
persons to teaching positions. This explanation could be extended to health, although it is also 
                         
13
 It is therefore not surprising that the worst post-apartheid corruption scandal that has embroiled the current 
president (Jacob Zuma) has been linked to the purchase of military equipment. In the same line of thinking (from a 
high technology standpoint), the ‘Albatross’ jet affair that has  rocked the Cameroonian institutional landscape has 
seen the arrest of many high profile politicians over the spectacular disappearances of $ 25 million destined for the 
purchase of a presidential plane.  
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disputable that sophisticated hospital equipment could give rise to opportunities of corruption
14
. 
This explanation confirms findings that corruption is linked to low spending on education and 
health in developing countries (Mauro, 1998; De la Croix & Delavallade, 2007). 
 Since, the negative nexus of government expenditure is contrary to the proposed 
theoretical background, it is relevant to devote space to explaining the discussion in the 
preceding paragraph to elaborate detail, with hard stylized facts. It is worthwhile noting that the 
‘project approach’ to foreign aid has underestimated the incentive problems with aid delivery. 
Hence, education and health ministries in recipient countries must be motivated to get school 
inputs and medicines respectively to citizens. Moreover, donor bureaucracies themselves must 
have the incentives to make sophisticated infrastructural projects successful.  
Firstly, with respect to education, whereas enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality 
of education has been hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school materials, 
corruption in ‘education bureaucracies’ and weak incentives for teachers (Filmer & Pritchett, 
1997).  
Secondly, from a health standpoint, some of the initial progress in Africa has slowed 
possibly due to the siphoning of funds (Easterly, 2005, p. 8). Studies in Cameroon, Guinea, 
Tanzania and Uganda estimate that 30 to 70% of government drugs disappear before they get to 
patients and complicated health issues cannot be solved in the absence of routine methods 
(Filmer et al., 2000; Prichett & Woolcock, 2004).   
Thirdly, with regard to the bureaucracy of sophisticated projects, there have been some 
alarming dysfunctional signs. For example, donors have spent over $2 billion over the past 20 
years on roads in Tanzania, but the roads have not improved. The principal output has been aid 
bureaucracy because about 2400 reports have been provided by 1000 donor missions and 
government experts each year (Asongu & Jellal, 2014). The situation in Tanzania should not be 
generalized because ‘aid conditionality’ is also a relevant issue. Accordingly, aid institutions 
could request complex road-building specifications based on models in developed countries. 
Hence, the underlying issue is also traceable to standards and procedural requirements.   
The three points above could be summarized with another example from Swaziland. It is 
a good aid candidate that substantially relies on foreign aid, allocates about 55% of its public 
                         
14
 To further illustrate this point, a recent budget scandal in South Africa has resulted from the government’s 
spending of R4 billion on entertainments, travel allowance and catering in 2011 while under-spending in health 
initiatives, which has left about 47% of metropolitan South Africans dissatisfied.  
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spending  to the wage bill, loses nearly double the annual social service budget to corruption, 
sells food aid and deposits the money in foreign bank accounts…etc. The above points have one 
common denominator: foreign aid channeled through dubious government expenditure 
mechanisms (that serve only the interests of corrupt officials) may not provide the right 
incentives for the growth of private investment and fixed capital formation needed for economic 
prosperity in recipient countries.  
 
4.2.2 Stimulating private investment with foreign aid through constraints on fiscal behavior 
 The main policy implication arising from this study is that donor agencies can condition 
aid to improve the fiscal system and management of aid-related government expenditure in order 
to facilitate the inflow of private investment and accrual of fixed capital needed for economic 
growth (Asongu & Jellal, 2014). Hence, we shall briefly discuss ‘revenue side’ and ‘expenditure 
side’ constraints on which development assistance can be conditioned in order to improve the 
fiscal behavior of recipient countries.  
 On the revenue dimension of fiscal management, the following constraints are worth 
noting. Firstly, a tax administration reform should embody the implementation of important anti-
corruption measures within the tax administrations, which include: (i) updating and modernizing 
tax agency procedures; (ii) restructuring of internal organization based on function 
(identification, assessment, billing…etc) instead of by ‘type of tax’;  (iii) reducing the number of 
clearances that are needed from taxpayers to complete compliance processes (i.e., the number of 
certifications, signatures, forms…etc); (iv) limiting the discretionary power of tax officials; (v) 
tax liability self-assessment and (vi) exploring the use of electronic filling. Secondly, semi-
autonomous revenue authorities are also vital. In essence, when properly implemented, this 
enclave dimension to tax administration reform will augment the possibility of de-politicizing 
tax officials, increase wage levels for tax officials and strengthen internal monitoring 
mechanisms. Consistent with the literature (Talercia, 2003; Bird, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 
2006), these semi-autonomous authorities have already been introduced in countries as diverse as 
Bolivia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Guatemala, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mexico, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela and Zambia. Thirdly, 
reforms of the tax system can reduce lucrative opportunities for tax officials. Simplification of 
the tax system by reducing the number of discretionary tax incentives, deductions and 
exemptions, is also worthwhile.  
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 From the supply perspective of fiscal management, the following constraints are 
advisable. Firstly, a modern treasury system should be installed in a bid to augment transparency 
in cash management and disbursement of resources for items authorized in the budget, needed 
for consistency between formulation and execution. It is also relevant for the treasury to operate 
separately from spending agencies and the discretionary power of treasury officials can be 
reduced by separating departments responsible for each budget execution stage. Secondly, 
financial management reforms should be requested by aid agencies in order to solidify basic 
procedures on budget accounting, auditing and reporting. In essence, the public expenditure 
management should make use of the integrated financial management systems and information 
technologies. Thirdly, a procurement system reform should be required to facilitate the 
establishment of standardized procurement processes, ensure maximum exposure and 
competition of foreign and national bidders as well as satisfy international procurement 
standards. On account of the fact that procurement systems can be particularly useful if 
combined with the necessary administrative capacity, independent audition of the procurement 
procedures should be conducted regularly and reviewed by parliament. Fourthly, a public 
expenditure tracking system should be developed to identify leaks in the budget implementation 
stage. Fifthly, civil service reform should be oriented towards key measures that mitigate the 
probabilities of patronage and corruption such as: reduction of turnover rates, merit-based 
recruitment, professionalization and de-politicization of public servants. Sixthly, a 
comprehensive coverage of the budget should minimize extra-budgetary and off-budget accounts 
in order to maximize transparency in the use of public resources. Seventhly, strategies that 
emphasize political accountability and political representation are necessary since broad political 
contestability decreases the opportunities of state capture. It is also worthwhile for ordinary 
citizens to have access to relevant information concerning public spending, including 
parliamentary debates on the budget formulation.  
 In addition to imposing constraints to improve the fiscal behavior of aid-recipient 
countries, from the revenue and expenditure sides, donors should also require an 
intergovernmental fiscal structure that favors the decentralization of spending responsibilities 
and revenue sources. This will provide increased accountability to citizens and provide local 
governments with greater autonomy, which can be instrumental in mitigating corruption in aid-
funded projects.  
It is interesting to note that for the most part, tax reforms have been weak and belated in 
most African countries (in spite of aid conditionalities), essentially because citizens are less 
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willing to comply with their tax obligations in the absence of political accountability. This is the 
case with countries on the continent because the Somaliland hypothesis provided by Eubank 
(2012) has been empirically verified by Asongu (2015b) in 53 African countries with data of the 
same periodicity as in the present line of inquiry. It follows that in the absence of foreign aid; the 
dependence of recipients’ governments on local tax income provides the leverage for enhanced 
political governance. The implication for our results is that foreign aid decreases tax burden and 
the forgone tax income can be reinvested into the economy by the private sector. This is 
essentially because in the absence of foreign aid, governments are more willing to improve 
political accountability in exchange for more tax income, since citizens are more willing to pay 
taxes only in exchange for greater political accountability. 
 In light of the above, expenditure reforms in Africa may have been working exclusively 
at headquarters, but not downwards in the value chain because of, inter alia: corruption in the 
allocation of projects and mismanagement in the implementation of corresponding projects. This 
has led to suggestions for more fiscal decentralization in policy   circles (e.g. the cases of 
Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan). Unfortunately, foreign aid conditional on fiscal 
decentralization is expectedly not a ‘welcomed policy’ by the political elites that are benefiting 
from corrupt and mismanagement practices linked to government centralization, in spite of the 
documented benefits of such policy reforms. For instance, Teko and Nkote (2014) have recently 
shown with the Ugandan experience that with effective fiscal decentralization, aid flows are 
better managed because capacity building is enhanced.  
 It is relevant to briefly engage Rwanda as an example of  good recipient countries where 
foreign aid has been spent productively. This country has particularly done well because of its 
specific development model that is based on substantial decentralization. Accordingly, Rwanda 
is widely recognized as a success story in aid effectiveness and economic development partly 
because of its good leadership and division of labour in the implementation of aid programs. 
These are consistent with: (i) decentralization and enhanced harmonization and (ii) alignment of 
national priorities with donor conditionalities. As documented by Abbott and Rwirahira  (2012), 
the country’s development strategy has resulted in: (i) enhanced transformation and economic 
growth, (ii) reduced aid dependency and (iii) boosted pro-poor growth.  
Before we conclude, it is important to emphasize that the findings are particularly 
relevant to African countries in the post-2015 development agenda because the April 2015 
World Bank report on MDGs extreme poverty targets has revealed that poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa, where 45% of 
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countries in the sub-region are substantially off-track from the target (World Bank, 2015). In 
essence private investment is a good source of employment and growth for poverty mitigation.  
   
5. Conclusion 
The paper has provided theoretical and empirical justifications for the instrumentality of 
foreign aid in stimulating private investment and fixed capital formation through fiscal policy 
mechanisms. We have proposed an endogenous growth theory based on an extension of Barro 
(1990) by postulating that the positive effect of aid mitigates the burden of the taxation system 
on the private sector of recipient countries. The empirical validity is based on data from 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010. While the findings on the tax effort channel are 
overwhelmingly consistent with theory across specifications and fundamental characteristics, 
those of the government expenditure channel are a little heterogeneous but broadly in line with 
the theoretical postulations. Justifications for the slight heterogeneity and policy implications 
have been discussed.   
We devote some space to caveats and future research directions. In light of theoretical 
underpinnings of the paper, the study has not taken two major elements into account. Firstly, it 
would be interesting to decompose government expenditure into its constituent elements in order 
to understand which components favor private investment activities more. This is essentially 
because corrupt officials would always device mechanisms by which to channel ‘aid funds’ to 
those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery and mismanagement. 
Secondly, the distinction between concessional loans and grants in the measurement of 
development assistance will enable a better understanding of the instrumentality of foreign aid in 
the investment-‘fiscal policy’ nexuses. For instance, the type of foreign aid that 
augments/reduces the tax effort related to private investments. Hence, interesting future research 
directions could include the incorporation of above caveats in order to provide policy makers 
with more specific findings. Moreover, future inquiries devoted to assessing investment volumes 
and policies within the frameworks of subsidies and tax privileges, would also enrich the extant 
literature.   
Moreover, in cases of bad recipient countries, it would be interesting to document what 
donors have done or are doing in terms of ‘aid conditionality’. Elucidating the political economy 
of these countries may be an important direction towards understanding how: (i) to deal with 
kleptokracies in Africa and (ii) such bad cases fit into the ‘aid conditionality approach’ based on 
fiscal behavior.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
Investment  Private Investment  12.979 9.400 -2.437 112.35 658 
Fixed Capital Formation    19.708 10.715 -23.76 113.58 706 
       
Fiscal 
Behaviour   
Government Expenditure   4.392 12.908 -57.815 90.544 468 
Tax Revenues  17.693 10.096 0.116 61.583 262 
       
Control 
variables  
Corruption Control Index   -0.607 0.623 -2.495 1.086 622 
Voice & Accountability    -0.674 0.734 -2.174 1.047 636 
       
 
Instrumental 
variables  
Total  NODA 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
NODA from DAC countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
NODA from Multilateral Donors 4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
Grants  0.069 0.115 0.000 1.477 773 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorization  
Upper Middle Income 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Lower Middle Income 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Middle Income 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
Low Income  0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
English  0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
French  0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Christianity  0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Islam   0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.886 0.317 0.000 1.000 795 
North Africa  0.113 0.317 0.000 1.000 795 
Oil  0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Non-oil 0.811 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Conflict  0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Non-conflict  0.773 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Landlocked  0.283 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
Not Landlocked  0.716 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis  
           
Fiscal Behavior Control variables Foreign Aid and Grants Investment  
Gov. Ex Tax rev CC V&A T.NODA NODADAC NODAMD Grants Priv Ivt GFCF  
1.000 0.098 0.082 0.012 0.039 0.038 0.021 0.036 0.054 0.111 Gov. Ex 
 1.000 0.508 0.317 -0.309 -0.304 -0.277 -0.290 0.448 0.551 Tax rev 
  1.000 0.665 -0.146 -0.148 -0.123 -0.117 0.151 0.330 CC 
   1.000 -0.0009 0.002 -0.002 0.018 0.153 0.212 V& A 
    1.000 0.995 0.900 0.808 -0.222 -0.084 T. NODA 
     1.000 0.733 0.780 -0.181 -0.070 NODADAC 
      1.000 0.716 -0.240 -0.097 NODAMD 
       1.000 -0.174 -0.091 Grants 
        1.000 0.895 Priv Ivt 
         1.000 GFCF 
           
Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Tax rev: Tax revenues. CC: Corruption Control. V& A: Voice & Accountability. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. T.NODA: Total NODA. NODADAC: NODA 
from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors. Piv Invt: Private Investment. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation.  
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Appendix 3: Categorization of Countries 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Upper Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa.  
10 
   
Lower Middle 
Income  
Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
12 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
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Religious 
Domination 
 
 
Christianity  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia. 
20 
    
 
 
Regions  
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
   47 
   
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia. 6 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
43 
    
 32 
 
Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
41 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
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Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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